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The emerging discourse of patient safety – the research and publication 
contribution of Frank Milligan 
ABSTRACT 
 
Introduction - This thesis presents the portfolio of evidence required for the award of a PhD 
by publication at the University of Bedfordshire. The theme that runs throughout is the 
contribution of the work analysed to the discourse of patient safety in terms of the theoretical, 
educational, practice development and research contribution made by the author.  
Aim and objectives - The aim of the portfolio is to provide a critical analysis of the 
contribution made by the author to the growing discourse of patient safety. The objectives 
were to synthesise those contributions through a narrative analysis of the publications with 
particular reference to:  
1. The delineation of patient safety as a viable discourse in healthcare 
2. The changing role of medicine as a profession within the context of patient safety 
3. The centrality of human factors theory in improving future patient safety practice 
4. Safety culture, its definition and problematic relationship with safeguarding 
5. Education and healthcare practice.  
The literature - The publications included here range in time scale from 1998 to 2017. 
Twenty-four pieces of literature are analysed and consist of a co-edited book, three research 
reports, four chapters from two different books and sixteen peer-reviewed journal articles. A 
citation summary for these publications is provided in Appendix 1. 
Key themes - Early publications focused on a critique of western medicine in order to 
highlight the unnecessary harm that was occurring in medically dominated healthcare 
systems. This critique moved through the concepts of iatrogenesis and adverse events before 
settling on patient safety as the key concept through which to influence quality enhancement 
in healthcare practice. The range and scale of the authors publications reviewed here added 
value to concepts such as safety culture and the centrality of patient safety incident reporting 
in such cultural shifts. Other aspects of human factors theory were promoted, most notably 
the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System leading on to research in the field of 
medication safety, human factors and safety culture in the context of the nursing home 
setting. These and other recent publications have highlighted inconsistencies in the 
relationship between patient safety and safeguarding, and argue that safeguarding has led to 
something of a return to the blame culture that has been historically present in healthcare.  
Conclusion - Patient safety is now a priority in healthcare, although one that has to operate 
within the political and financial constraints that are inevitably associated with healthcare 
provision. The evidence and analysis given here shows that the publication and research 
record generated has both reflected and facilitated the growing discourse of patient safety. 
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1. Introduction and background  
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis, which is presented as the portfolio of evidence required for the award of a PhD by 
publication at the University of Bedfordshire, focuses upon the theoretical, methodological, 
research and educational contribution made by the author to the growing discourse of patient 
safety. It constitutes a narrative synthesis and evaluation of author literature published on 
patient safety (See appendices 1 and 3). The unifying theme that runs throughout the portfolio 
is the contribution of the work analysed here to the discourse of patient safety.  
There are five major sections addressing each of the objectives set out below. The portfolio 
opens by setting out an aim and objectives. It then discusses the origins of the discourse of 
patient safety and the place of the profession of medicine within that discourse and the 
challenges to medical power that the patient safety agenda has generated. Particular 
attention is then paid to the impact of the field of human factors theory in healthcare. The 
work closes through a re-visioning of the notion of safety culture and the role of safeguarding 
within this.  
1.2 Aim and objectives 
Aim 
The aim of this portfolio is to provide a narrative analysis of the contribution made by the 
author to the growing discourse of patient safety. 
Objectives 
The objectives of this portfolio are to synthesise the contributions made through an analysis 
of publications made in the field with particular reference to:  
1. The delineation of patient safety as a viable discourse in healthcare 
2. Limits to medicine as a profession within the context of patient safety 
3. The centrality of human factors theory in improving future patient safety practice 
4. Safety culture, its definition and problematic relationship with safeguarding  
5. Education and healthcare practice. 
These objectives are dealt with in sections 2 to 6 and are reflected in the section headings.  
1.3 The concept of discourse  
The notion of discourse is important in terms of understanding the narrative analysis 
presented here. Discourse refers to the language and the way in which language is used to 
describe particular events and projects (Burr, 2015). Parker et al. (1999 p.3) defined it as 
referring “…to patterns of meaning which organize the various symbolic systems human 
beings inhabit, and which are necessary for us to make sense to each other”. Discourse is 
therefore an important concept as healthcare will work towards certain goals, and with limited 
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resources this will inevitably be at the expense of other goals. To be viewed as a priority a 
concept needs to be identified within the broad discourse of healthcare practice and patient 
safety has only recently achieved such a position. Discourse is about power, as for example 
analysed in Michel Foucault’s (1991) ‘Discipline and Punish’ and, importantly in terms of 
unnecessary harm in healthcare, in the critique of medicine offered in the book ‘The birth of 
the clinic’ (Foucault, 1991a). As Foucault suggested, discourse offers the possibility of certain 
kinds of identities and to be a priority patient safety would have to be seen as a relevant and 
viable discourse (Rowland and Kitto, 2014), thereby becoming part of the identity of some, if 
not all, healthcare practitioners. As will become evident in the narrative analysis given, being 
a proponent of patient safety, and the healthcare benefits that such an approach can bring, is 
a relatively new possibility brought about through the growing discourse of patient safety.  
1.4 Defining patient safety 
Patient safety is arguably a 21st century enterprise. There was a concept of patient safety 
before the year 2000, but it was the combination of a number of different events around the 
turn of the century that saw the emergence in this and other countries of the field of policy, 
research, education and practice we now know as patient safety (Emanuel, 2008; Walshe 
and Boaden, 2008; Rowley and Waring, 2011; Vincent and Amalbertie, 2016; Woodward, 
2017). That history can be seen in book titles in that those mentioning patient safety were 
rare before the year 2000 (See appendix 2). In the UK, the move towards using the phrase 
patient safety can be linked to the creation of the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) in 
2001. As an arm’s length body of the Department of Health its establishment was an 
acknowledgement of the high levels of unnecessary harm that were occurring in the NHS 
(DH, 2000; DH, 2002). The functions of the NPSA, on its closure, were transferred to NHS 
England in 2012 and now sit with NHS Improvement (2017).  
Patient safety is defined by the World Health Organisation as “…the reduction of risk of 
unnecessary harm associated with health care to an acceptable minimum” (WHO, 2012, p.3). 
The same document defines a patient safety incident as “…an event or circumstance that 
could have resulted, or did result, in unnecessary harm to a patient” (p.3). A concept analysis 
from a nursing perspective was completed by Kim et al. (2015) and concluded that the 
defining attributes were the prevention of medical errors and avoidable adverse events (an 
incident where a patient is harmed (WHO, 2012). In a helpful text titled ‘What exactly is 
patient safety?’ Emanuel et al. (2008) define it as “… a discipline in the health care sector that 
applies safety science methods toward the goal of achieving a trustworthy system of health 
care delivery” and continues, “… it minimizes the incidence and impact of, and maximizes 
recovery from, adverse events”, a position more recently supported by Woodward (2017). 
The term adverse event is often used interchangeably with patient safety, which it pre-dates, 
and refers to unintended injury caused by medical management and not the disease process 
(Vincent, 2010). The term can be found in classic patient safety literature such as the Bristol 
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Royal Infirmary Inquiry1 (2001; Kennedy, 2001) and ‘An Organisation with a memory’ (DH, 
2000; 2002) where the phrase patient safety was largely absent.2 Common examples of 
patient safety incidents include surgical operations on the wrong patient (or wrong part of a 
patient), medication errors including wrong drug and wrong dose, and healthcare acquired 
infections. 
Progress towards more positive levels of patient safety arguably remain disappointingly slow 
(Rowland and Kitto, 2014; Woodward, 2017). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) has calculated that harm related to patient safety incidents is the 
14th leading global disease burden, comparable to tuberculosis and malaria (Slawomirski et 
al., 2017). Hogan et al. (2012) in a retrospective case review of hospital patient records 
calculated 11,800 preventable deaths in English hospitals were due to problems in care. The 
Hogan et al. work is interesting in that the terms patient safety incident, adverse event and 
error were combined within the operational concept of ‘problems in care’. 
Some patient safety incidents are termed ‘never events’. They are defined as “…serious, 
largely preventable patient safety incidents that should not occur if existing national guidance 
or safety recommendations have been implemented by healthcare providers” (NHS 
Improvement, 2016 p.3). Never events are clearly specified, with 14 identified under current 
guidance from wrong site surgery to scalding of patients with hot water and are, theoretically 
at least, preventable (NHS England, 2015). Even in this highly monitored aspect of provision 
in 2014 there were 83 wrong site surgery events reported (operations on the right person, but 
the wrong place on that person), 42 wrong implant/prosthesis events and 130 retained foreign 
surgical object events (NHS England, 2014). Provisional data from an eight-month period in 
2016 showed that a total of 270 surgical Never Events had been reported (NHS 
Improvement, 2016). Calculating from these figures for a full twelve months gives an estimate 
of around 360 never events, which would be a rise of the 2012/3 figure.3  
1.5 Summary 
With this background in mind a critical narrative analysis of my publications is now given 
following the five objectives stated above.  
 
  
                                                        
1  The ‘Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry’ (2001; DH, 2002), is widely acknowledged as a turning point in 
patient safety in this country. The report carried similar messages to ‘An organisation with a memory’ 
(DH, 2000), in that significant failings leading to unacceptable levels of serious injury and preventable 
death were occurring to babies and small children being treated with cardiothoracic surgery at the 
hospital. 
2  The report, ‘An organisation with a memory’ (DH, 2000; 2002), was commissioned by the then Labour 
Government as an expert groups evaluation of the state of the NHS. A theme in the report was the 
notion that the NHS did not have a memory when it came to errors impacting on patient health. 
3  That rise might be attributable to ongoing improvements in reporting, particularly with regard to Never 
Event reporting (NHS Improvement, 2016).  
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2. Objective 1 - The delineation of patient safety as a viable discourse in 
healthcare 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This section is the first of four that presents a narrative analysis of the objectives set out in the 
introduction. It opens by exploring the notion of harm in healthcare and the need to 
differentiate between harm that is a necessary consequence of care and treatment and harm 
that is unnecessary – patient safety incidents. It traces the origins and development of the 
discourse of patient safety and the writing and research that I was generating within that 
discourse. 
2.2 Necessary and unnecessary harm in healthcare 
There is an assumption in the history of medicine and nursing that healthcare should ‘do no 
harm’ to the patient. Early efforts to deal will disease and ill health were sometimes more 
dangerous than the problems being treated (Sharpe and Faden, 1998). In the preface to the 
1863 edition of the book ‘Notes on hospital design’, Nightingale opened by saying “It may 
seem a strange principle to enunciate as the very first requirement in a Hospital that it should 
do the sick no harm” (Nightingale, 1863 p.iii). Some, such as Woodward (2017) in a recent 
book analysing the current state of healthcare, name her as a key figure in patient safety 
history. Sharpe and Faden (1998) in their comprehensive analysis of medical harm defined 
iatrogenic illness as doctor generated harm. They went back to the Hippocratic oath written 
over two thousand years ago, which they note is often simplified to read ‘first do no harm’. 
The analysis given shows that medicine as a profession has a long history of causing harm to 
patients, both necessary and unnecessary. With regard to unnecessary harm Sharpe and 
Faden note that this has been caused through its methods, but also through structural means 
in that professional aims have been put above those of the patient. More recent evidence on 
this can be found in the book by Mukherjee (2011) that gives a history of cancer treatment 
and some of the failings in medical and research practice that are part of that history. 
Mukherjee, as well as Marsh (2015)4 who wrote a recent reflection on his career as a 
neurosurgeon, makes it clear that both necessary and unnecessary harm are intrinsic to 
medical practice.  
My first publication on what would now be called patient safety was an article titled ‘The 
iatrogenic epidemic’ (Milligan, 1998). The article, which in terms of method was a narrative 
analysis, was unusual in that there was little in the way of a substantial discourse on the 
                                                        
4  The text by Marsh is interesting in that he describes what are clearly, on some occasions, patient 
safety incidents, but does not identify them as such.  
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concept of unnecessary harm in healthcare.5 It sought to highlight the levels and types of 
unnecessary harm occurring utilising the concept of iatrogenesis. In a medically dominated 
healthcare system, a notion that was analysed in more depth in the later chapter titled 
‘Defining medicine and the nature of iatrogenic harm’ (Milligan, 2003a), the concept of 
iatrogenesis was contentious as it turned the focus on causes of unnecessary harm towards 
medicine.  
My article drew on the work of Ivan Illich (1990), an emotive and controversial writer who 
identified three types of iatrogenesis: clinical, social and cultural. These were used in the 
article to establish some practical and everyday links with unnecessary harm in healthcare. 
The examples ranged from the pragmatic in terms of clinical iatrogenesis, the errors and 
misdiagnosis that can occur,6 to the stress generated through health screening and the 
alienation associated with cultural iatrogenesis. This first article brought together a number of 
ideas that were to feature in later research and publications, not least of which were the 
concepts of unnecessary and inappropriate surgery.7  
The most common use of the concept of iatrogenesis at that time was in relation to problems 
in the management of medication, although the important text by Sharpe and Faden (1998) 
mentioned above was to be published later in that year. Another important book was 
published the following year by Rosenthal et al. (1999) containing a chapter by Leape (1999) 
that did identify a range of earlier research pointing to significant levels of unnecessary harm.8 
As with Sharpe and Faden (1998) the phrase patient safety was not utilised by Rosenthal et 
al. The notion of unnecessary harm was, with hindsight, the most important idea within my 
first publication (Milligan, 1998), although couched within the concept of iatrogenesis which 
was limited by definition to harm caused by the profession of medicine and not other 
disciplines or aspects of healthcare. A second article (Milligan, 2000) on problems being 
encountered with the large general hospital followed and is dealt with in detail in section 3.   
2.3 The birth of a discourse of patient safety  
With hindsight those early publications (Milligan, 1998; 2000) were both a part of and 
reflective of, the emerging discourse of what was to become known as patient safety. A 
number of key patient safety events and publications occurred between the years 1999 and 
2001. Those events included, amongst others, publication in the UK of ‘An organisation with a 
memory’ (DH, 2000), the ‘Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry’ (2001) and the Kohn et al. (2000) 
                                                        
5  The article was being written at the same time as the publication by Sharpe and Faden.  
6  Khullar and Jena (2016) cite a diagnostic errors rates of up to 15% with Graber (2007) citing evidence 
of 10% diagnostic error rates found at post-mortem. 
7  The problems of unnecessary and inappropriate surgery would be highlighted and analysed further in 
Milligan 2003a and Milligan 2007. The issue was highlighted again recently through the case of the 
surgeon Ian Patterson, who was convicted of the unlawful wounding of women during breast surgery. 
His case is analysed later in this portfolio. 
8  The book by Rosenthal, Mulcahy and Lloyd-Bostock (1999), titled ‘Medical mishaps’ pieces of the 
puzzle’, was published in 1999. It reflects the lack of a clear focus that existed at the time in terms of 
speaking of unnecessary harm in healthcare. There is brief mention of the concept iatrogenic injury, but 
it does not use the phrase patient safety.  
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report ‘To err is human’ in the USA.9 These and other publications of the time highlighted the 
high error and preventable death rates that were occurring in healthcare systems (Woodward, 
2017). They coincided with the conviction of the General Practitioner and mass murderer 
Harold Shipman in the year 2000 (Baker, 2001; Smith, 2005). Although Shipman’s case was 
unusual (it is dealt with in more detail in section 3), healthcare practitioners rarely murder 
patients, the case contributed to a growing wave of cultural unease with regard to the quality 
and safety of healthcare provision. The delays in detecting Shipman’s practice were given as 
an example of cultural iatrogenesis in a later chapter exploring issues related to 
organisations, professions and patient safety (Milligan, 2007). 
2.4 Limiting harm in healthcare 
It was against the increasing acknowledgement of the unnecessary harm occurring in 
healthcare at the turn of the century that the motivation for the book ‘Limiting in harm in 
healthcare: a nursing perspective’ (Milligan and Robinson, 2003) developed. Although the 
project arose from unease with aspects of healthcare, particularly the role and place of the 
medical profession in achieving broader public health and health promotion goals, cross-
disciplinary support, including from medicine itself (Richardson, 2003), and an experienced 
co-editor were quickly secured. The book was founded on the notion of unnecessary harm 
and made extensive use of the concept of iatrogenesis. The key aims were: to critique the 
effectiveness of western medicine in terms of its contribution to healthcare; clarify the nature 
and extent of iatrogenic harm; explore the expanding scope of nursing practice; and finally, to 
offer suggestions on ways of reducing the levels of unnecessary harm being seen. In terms of 
method, it was an attempt to consolidate and broaden the discourse on unnecessary harm in 
healthcare. Although the concepts of iatrogenic harm and medical gaze (Foucault, 1991) 
were not used to structure all the chapters they did act as a foundation for the overall analysis 
given.  
2.5 Consolidating a discourse of patient safety  
The analyses given in the book delivered a fuller evaluation of the concepts iatrogenesis and 
unnecessary harm from a range of different perspectives. The outcome in terms of my own 
writing was a reduction in the use of the concept iatrogenesis in favour of the concepts 
adverse event and patient safety. This shift represented both an appreciation of the limits of 
iatrogenesis as a means through which to promote patient safety and the emergence of the 
new patient safety discourse. The creation of the National Patient Safety Agency in 2001, and 
its ongoing work with what was to become the National Reporting and Learning System10 
                                                        
9  The Kohn (2000) report was an evaluation of the state of medical error, what would now be termed 
patient safety or adverse events, in the USA at the time and reached similar conclusions with regard to 
preventable harms and death to those reported in ‘An organisation with a memory’ (DH, 2001). 
10  Creation of the National Reporting and Learning Service was a key aspect of NPSA work. The 
principles upon which the NRLS was based, an open, fair and anonymous system of patient safety 
incident reporting, were derived in part from the recommendations of ‘An organisation with a memory’ 
(DH, 2000).  
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(NRLS), saw the increasing and widespread use of the phrase ’patient safety’, a position I 
sought to reflect in my writing. 
Further publications were secured to help reach a broader audience (see Milligan and Bird, 
2003; 2003a and Bird and Milligan 2003; 2003a). These marked a shift away from use of the 
concept iatrogenic harm in favour of the term adverse event. An emphasis was placed 
throughout the series on defining the extent of the problem, citing examples of unnecessary 
harm in the need to move away from the blame culture that had been so common in 
healthcare. Another important concept given priority was the near miss, where a patient 
safety related error is avoided but not reported. At that point in time the reporting of near 
events in healthcare was rare. The third article (Bird and Milligan, 2003) anticipated a rise in 
the number of error reports being made in the NHS due to the increasing complexity of 
treatment, the ageing population and the increasingly rapid throughput of in-patients. The 
closing article (Milligan and Bird, 2003a) explored the challenge of a blame–free culture, a 
notion that would be amended during later work at the NPSA where an ‘open and fair’ culture 
was to become the policy implemented.11 This article also spent some time on lessons being 
learned from aviation, an area that would be developed further in the article on the Human 
Factors and Analysis Classification System as applied to medication administration errors 
(Milligan, 2007a) and in more recent research into medication errors (Milligan et al. 2015; 
2015a).  
In a further attempt to broaden the discourse of patient safety an article was written with a 
midwifery colleague (Madden and Milligan, 2004). It sought to raise awareness of the 
relevance of patient safety, the phrase was now used in my writing in preference to 
iatrogenesis or adverse event, in maternity practice where there was little discussion or 
literature available on unnecessary harm at the time. As with the Milligan and Bird series 
above the significance of near miss events was emphasised highlighting a difference in the 
definition of the concept between the field of patient safety and maternity services. In the 
Confidential Enquiries12 of the time (CESpi, 2001) the term related to situations in which a 
woman nearly died as opposed to a patient safety incident where an error almost occurs but 
is avoided. It was argued that the inclusion and analysis of further incidents where death did 
not occur, a more accurate use of the term near-miss in patient safety work, would aid future 
learning in maternity practice. The article, consistent with other publications analysed here, 
promoted a systems approach to explanations of error.  
Further consolidation of the discourse of patient safety was achieved in articles written during 
a part-time secondment at the NPSA as one of two clinical specialty advisors for nursing 
(Milligan and Dennis, 2004; 2005). The first article set-out the nature and purpose of the 
NPSA and the role of clinical specialty advisor. The notion of safety culture was again 
                                                        
11  More recently this position has been consolidated within ‘The professional duty of candour’ for 
medical and nursing staff (GMC/NMC, 2016). 
12  For further details on the history and development of the Confidential Enquiries at that time see 
Weindling (2004). 
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analysed emphasising the need to move away from blame towards a more open and fair 
culture. The potential impact of the patient safety agenda on the working conditions of staff 
was analysed, pre-dating the later arguments that human factors is very much the friend of 
staff – it improves working conditions (Milligan, 2007a; Carayon, 2012). The first article 
(Milligan and Dennis, 2004) closed with an acknowledgement that all staff are involved in 
harm to patients, but that some of that harm is unavoidable being an inevitable consequence 
of care and treatment, yet other harm is avoidable – patient safety incidents. The second 
article reiterated the definition of patient safety, the importance of near-miss events in terms 
learning from incidents and then concentrated on the notion of safety culture (Milligan and 
Dennis, 2005).  
 2.6 Discussion 
The call to do no harm in the history of healthcare demonstrates an appreciation of the risks 
inherent in care and treatment delivery. In with this there has been a long-standing 
appreciation of the possibility of error, inadvertent harm and malicious practice, but that 
understanding lacked focus and open discussion; a discourse through which to theorise and 
operationalise what we would now refer to as patient safety research and practice. My early 
publications sought to surface the concept of unnecessary harm, drawing on the evidence 
that was available and generating new evidence, thereby further consolidating a discourse of 
patient safety. The concepts of iatrogenesis and adverse events were the background to my 
early writing, but it was patient safety that was to give the dialogue on unnecessary harm in 
my work, and the wider literature, the clarity we now see.  
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3. Objective 2 - Limits to medicine and the discourse of patient safety 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Inevitably the emerging discourse of patient safety was a challenge to medicine. Western 
healthcare had very much been built on the profession of medicine and its biomedical 
positivist philosophy and methods (Foucault, 1991). Any critique of healthcare remains, 
therefore, a challenge to medicine as the two are so inextricably linked and my early writing, 
as seen below, sought to consolidate that challenge. 
3.2 The decline of the large general hospital?  
Building on my 1998 article analysed above, a second article was published offering a critique 
of the general hospital (Milligan, 2000). The title, ‘Anticipating the decline of the large general 
hospital’ was deliberately contentious in an attempt to draw attention to the unnecessary 
harm that medically dominated healthcare can generate. It was suggested in the article that 
the general hospital as designed and utilised at the time, was becoming outdated in terms of 
effectively meeting the health needs of the public. The examples used in the article included 
the rising threat of hospital acquired infections, increasing information and computer 
technology use, the rise in the population size and the problems of the public travelling to 
centralised hospital facilities. Illich (1974) had talked of the disabling nature of cars, in that we 
see cars as both a consequence of and means to liberation, but we end up stuck in traffic, 
disabled in a sense by the sheer numbers of people who have access to cars. Information 
and computer technology improvements were highlighted (Milligan, 2000) as a means of 
taking diagnosis and treatment to people rather than obliging people to go to the hospital, 
although there were to be significant delays in the adoption of information and computer 
technology as seen in the goals set by the then Labour government (NHS Executive, 1998). 
These points were used to argue that smaller, local provision was perhaps a better way 
forward in future healthcare provision.  
The critique offered on the large general hospital13 also explored the notion of it as a symbol 
of medical professional power, and that technological changes such as the internet were 
emerging threats to that power, a point repeated in the concluding chapter of the book 
                                                        
13  Hospital design continues to evolve in response to healthcare acquired infections and the rise of 
antibiotic resistant bacteria. Authors such as Urich and Zimring (2004) in a review of research on the 
impact of the physical hospital environment on patient outcomes, suggested a move towards much 
more side-room provision, a challenge to Nightingale (1863) influenced hospital design. They also 
emphasised the impact of the hospital environment on staff efficiency and morale.  
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‘Limiting harm in healthcare’ (Milligan and Robinson, 2003b). In both the article and the 
chapter it was argued that if a foundation of profession status is knowledge, then what 
happens to status and the power that goes with it when the public have more open access to 
a professions knowledge (Milligan, 2000; Milligan, 2003a).  
The concept of the biomedical gaze and the limitations it has brought to healthcare were 
analysed in the chapter ‘Defining medicine and the nature of iatrogenic harm’ (Milligan, 2003). 
In this, with regard to the use of information and computer technology,14 it was argued that 
the delay in adoption in the NHS was in part about the reluctance of the medical profession to 
see a move away from human - the professionals diagnosis, towards computer supported 
diagnosis, even though good evidence existed at the time that this would be a positive step 
forward for the patient, a point analysed in the chapter ‘Defining medicine and the nature of 
iatrogenic harm’ (Milligan, 2003).  
3.3 Professions, organisations and unnecessary harm 
The chapter in the book ‘Understanding patient safety’ constructed a critique of professionals, 
professions and organisations in the context of the patient safety agenda (Milligan, 2007). So 
as not to fall into the trap of writing something potentially uninvolving for an often-pragmatic 
healthcare audience, the decision was made to analyse some of the more extreme examples 
of unnecessary harm that have occurred and the professional and organisational 
repercussions that arose from them. The notion of healthcare professionals ‘doing no harm’ 
(Nightingale 1863; Sharpe and Faden, 1998) was again analysed in the chapter to reinforce 
the emerging discourse of patient safety. It was reiterated that harm is inevitable in attempts 
to improve public health through the care and treatment delivered by health services. In 
dealing with medicine as a profession, its place and position in healthcare had to again be 
acknowledged and analysed. As with the earlier chapter (Milligan, 2003a) the assertion was 
that medicine was, and remains, the most powerful profession in healthcare and, therefore, 
any explanation as to why rates of unnecessary harm are acknowledged as being high ought 
to turn to medicine for part of the explanation. Research for the chapter included documentary 
analysis of the former General Practitioner and multiple murderer Harold Shipman in with 
three other medical staff who had committed malicious and inept acts; Rodney Ledward, 
Richard Neale and Peter Green (Milligan, 2007).  
The chapter opened by claiming that patient safety was a 21st century enterprise, something 
now widely accepted in this (Rowley and Waring, 2011; Vincent and Amalberti, 2016; 
Woodward, 2017) and other countries (National Patient Safety Foundation, 2015; OECD, 
2017). It reiterated key parts of the patient safety agenda, such as the levels of unnecessary 
harm estimated to be occurring and consolidated patient safety as an important discourse 
that all healthcare practitioners should be conversant with, a position subsequently 
                                                        
14  The ‘Information for health’ (NHS Executive, 1998) strategy had set a goal of lifelong electronic 
patient records that would be available across different healthcare sectors, something that is still yet to 
be achieved. 
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consolidated through the international patient safety curriculum guide published by the World 
Health Organisation (WHO, 2011).  
Details of the four medical practitioner case studies were used to give substance to the 
arguments put forward with the bulk of the analysis being given over to the former GP and 
multiple murderer Harold Shipman. It cannot be certain exactly how many patients he 
murdered, most often by injection of an opiate overdose, but estimates of around 250 people, 
mostly elderly women, are broadly accepted (Baker, 2001; Smith, 2005). The other cases 
analysed included another GP convicted of 9 counts of sexual assault on his patients and two 
consultant gynaecologists who had high complication rates in their surgery with one, Rodney 
Ledward (Ritchie Report, 2000), performing significant levels of unnecessary and 
inappropriate surgery on women (Milligan, 2007). 
An argument was constructed in the chapter that suggested healthcare cannot rely on 
professional status alone to protect patients from patient safety incidents. Many patient safety 
incidents are linked to error in its various forms, but some, as these and other cases have 
shown (See Ian Patterson below) are due to a lack of competence (I used the term inept 
practice) and/or criminal activity (I used the term malicious practice). The four case studies 
demonstrated the potential dangers of an over reliance on professional status and the trend, 
in professions, to protect the professional first then the patient. It was shown that it can be 
difficult for the public and healthcare practitioners to raise concerns about medical staff. The 
typical picture seen in the cases analysed was one of incompetent and/or malicious practice 
over an extended period of time with failures to detect that practice, or a failure of managers 
and organisations to act upon evidence of malicious or inept practice. This was clearly the 
case with both Shipman (Smith, 2005; Peters, 2005) and Ledward, (Ritchie, 2000) and was 
seen again recently in the case of the surgeon Ian Patterson (Kennedy, 2015).  
The evidence cited and the conclusions offered in the chapter were critical of professional 
regulation and argued that the medical profession can at times protect its membership at the 
expense of public safety. In the conclusion, it was suggested that staff consider putting the 
patient first, not the profession or the organisation, a position reflected in the recent 
GMC/NMC (2015) Duty of Candour guidance. This places an obligation on staff and 
organisations to be honest with patients when patient safety incidents occur. The guidance 
makes it clear that medical and nursing staff must tell the patient (or carer where relevant) 
when something has gone wrong. A theme that evolved on reviewing the four cases in the 
chapter was that staff were sometimes reluctant to disclose concerns, and in some ways 
anticipated the need for some of the surveillance strategies seen in the safeguarding agenda 
as discussed in section 5. It was the ideas formulated in this chapter that also shaped and 
supported the subsequent literature review on students raising concerns with the quality of 
practice they encounter on clinical and social care placements (Milligan et al. 2016; 2017). 
Reflecting back on the chapter on professions and patient safety the concept of safeguarding 
was absent as it had yet to consolidate its own discourse, yet a similar chapter if written now 
would have to utilise the concept of safeguarding. This is important in that safeguarding was 
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to have a significant influence on later research conducted on medication errors in the nursing 
home setting as seen in the next section (Milligan, et al. 2015; 2015a). 
3.4 Limiting unnecessary and inappropriate treatment 
The issue of unnecessary and inappropriate treatment has been returned to at the time of 
writing this thesis with regard to Ian Patterson (Kennedy, 2015), a surgeon who was 
convicted of 17 counts of wounding with intent and three counts of unlawful wounding. He 
was sentenced to 15 years in goal.15 An investigation into his practice (Kennedy, 2015) found 
that he was, over a long period of time, able to perform inappropriate and unnecessary 
surgery. His case reflects findings and conclusions reached in the chapter on professions and 
patient safety (Milligan, 2007). Kennedy found a failure of the employing organisation to 
manage concerns about Patterson’s practice, leading to delays in his being called to account 
for his poor performance. As with the cases of Richard Neale and Rodney Ledward (Milligan, 
2007), there was a failure to follow up on earlier concerns with performance by managers 
struggling to control Patterson’s activities. His status as a medical professional awarded him a 
level of protection that inhibited attempts to accurately evaluate and manage his work. The 
obtaining of and adherence to consent gained from patients was another aspect of Paterson’s 
practice that caused concern. He had been performing operations that did not reflect the 
consent given by patients, and through the tissue sparing mastectomies he completed it was 
concluded by Kennedy that Paterson had placed his patients under additional risk of 
recurrence of their malignancy. As in the case of Rodney Ledward there was a lack of clarity 
with regard to assessing his poor performance in part due to the fact that he worked in both 
the NHS and private care sectors (Ritchie, 2000; Milligan, 2007). It is likely that an enquiry 
into his practice will be convened although at the time of writing that has not been confirmed.  
3.5 Discussion 
The place of the medical profession in healthcare is under increasing scrutiny in the context 
of the discourse of patient safety. Limits to healthcare, such as high error rates and the other 
forms of unnecessary harm that are increasingly acknowledged and subject to scrutiny, 
generate significant challenge and these are discussed further in the next section. My 
contribution to this aspect of the discourse included challenges to the dominance of the large 
general hospital as a focus for healthcare provision. It went on to critique medicine as a 
profession and the repercussions of an unquestioning reliance on professional status in 
supporting and promoting patient safety. I have argued that reliance on professional status 
has limits in terms of the possibility and management of unnecessary and inappropriate 
treatment (Milligan, 2007), a problem that closed this section and that has returned to current 
debate through the case of Ian Patterson (Kennedy, 2015).  
                                                        
15  The gaol sentence was subsequently extended on review to 20 years. See 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/aug/03/breast-surgeon-ian-paterson-sentence-for-
needless-operations-unduly-lenient (Accessed 4-9-17). 
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4. Objective 3 - The centrality of human factors theory in improving 
patient safety practice 
 
4.1 Introduction and definition 
In the previous section on limits to medicine the early critique of healthcare in my writing 
focused on the medical profession and its position of power at the top of the healthcare 
hierarchy. Having explored and applied concepts such as iatrogenic and unnecessary harm 
(Milligan, 1998; Milligan and Robinson, 2003), and acknowledging that the problems of 
unnecessary harm went beyond the profession of medicine in that analysis (Milligan, 2003), it 
was patient safety that came to dominate my writing, a position consistent with acceptance of 
the concept as a viable international discourse in healthcare (See for example Vincent, 2010; 
WHO, 2011). It was to be human factors theory that would give a more grounded approach to 
my writings in terms of offering a critique of, and possible solutions to, some of the 
unnecessary harm in healthcare provision. It has been historically common to blame the 
practitioner at the ‘sharp end’ when things go wrong as opposed to accepting the primacy of 
system explanations in healthcare, the so called ‘blunt end’ (Cook and Woods, 1994). Human 
factors theory and the focus that it brings to ‘blunt end’, perhaps better known as system, 
explanations of error has been key in moving healthcare towards a more positive safety 
culture. Human factors is defined by the International Ergonomics Association16 as “...the 
scientiﬁc discipline concerned with the understanding of interactions among humans and 
other elements of a system, and the profession that applies theory, principles, data and 
methods to design in order to optimize human well-being and overall system performance” 
(Carayon, 2012 p.4).  
4.2 The National Patient Safety Agency 
Attempts to improve patient safety involve links with safety critical industries such as aviation 
and those industries have used human factors theory to dramatically improve safety. Early 
texts such as Bognor (1994) and Rosthenthal et al. (1990), drew heavily on aviation when 
judging the failings in safety and the high rates of error encountered in healthcare. These 
influences were seen when I was working at the NPSA (circa 2004) in the use of human 
factors theory in the work the organisation was planning and delivering. Publication of the 
Seven Steps to Patient Safety (NPSA, 2004; 2004a)17 was clear evidence of that influence. It 
espoused the need to build a positive safety culture, move away from blame when error 
                                                        
16  In some human factors literature the terms ergonomics and human factors are used interchangeably.  
17  Further versions of the guide were subsequently produced by the NPSA for primary care, mental 
health and general practice.  
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occurred, promoted the value of incident reporting and sought to enhance learning from error 
(NPSA, 2004), a position promoted in my writing (See for example Milligan and Bird, 2003a 
and Milligan and Dennis, 2004). There was no direct mention of human factors theory in the 
NPSA Seven Steps document and it was to be more practical parts of human factors theory, 
as opposed to the rather esoteric concept of culture (see section 5), that were a focus in my 
later writings. The most prominent of these was error, its inevitability and frequency, in with 
the historical preference, both within and outside of healthcare, to blame the individual when 
things go wrong rather than to look to systems explanations. The Incident Decision Tree 
(NPSA/NHS Confederation, 2003) clearly set this out in a flow chart designed for managers 
investigating patient safety incidents. The tool made it clear that the majority of patient safety 
incidents would be due to system failures and not individual practitioners, a theme promoted 
in my writing and in the research I later developed and delivered (Milligan et al. 2015; 2015a). 
Further evidence on the balance of error explanation and where it should sit can be found 
with authors such as Gwande (2010). In explaining development of the World Health 
Organisation Surgical safety checklist, he estimated 75% or more of errors as being system 
related. Reason (1990; 2008), a widely respected expert in applying human factors in 
healthcare, puts the figure nearer 90% with Norman (2013), in an analysis of error and the 
impact of good design on reducing error, suggesting that 99% of the explanation for error sits 
with system and design factors and not with the individual. Such assertions were promoted 
through publications such as Milligan and Bird (2003), Milligan and Dennis (2004) and 
Madden and Milligan (2004). The latter, as previously mentioned, analysing the propensity of 
error and system explanations of that error, in the maternity setting. 
4.3 The Human Factors Analysis Classification System (HFACS) 
In Milligan (2007a) I sought to draw together important aspects of human factors and directly 
link them to the common problem of drug administration errors committed by nursing staff. 
The article, after a definitional analysis of human factors, focused on a framework used in 
accident investigation, the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) 
(Weigmann and Shappell, 2003). The framework offers a method through which to go beyond 
simply blaming the person present when an accident occurs. It explores the nature of the 
incident, the error (or errors within it), and a range of potential contributory factors. It is based 
on a number of important human factor concepts the most notable of which is Reason’s 
‘accident causation model’ (Reason, 1990). In that model, it is argued that where there are 
failures in a system the product of that system is adversely affected. In aviation, the product 
of concern is passenger and staff safety, whereas in healthcare it is patient safety.  
HFACS is used widely in aviation and other safety critical industries, for example the maritime 
and oil/pipeline industries (Celik and Cebi, 2009; Theophilus et al. 2017).18 A central tenet on 
                                                        
18  The article that linked the HFACS system to drug administration errors (Milligan, 2007a) has been 
cited widely including the maritime (Celik and Cebi, 2009) and pipeline industries (Theophilus et al. 
2017). See appendix 1 for citations linked to publications analysed within this portfolio.  
  15 
which HFACS is based is that errors vary in type - there are different causes of error, and that 
factors other than those related to the operator (the nurse in drug administration) are 
significant. The four levels are: 
• Unsafe actions of the operator (error type) 
• Pre-conditions for unsafe acts 
• Supervisory factors 
• Organisational factors. 
HFACS theory was combined with a theoretical analysis of drug administration errors in the 
article (Milligan, 2007a). A key point in HFACS is that the cause of error usually lies outside 
the operator – in the case of drug administration the nurse (Milligan, 2007a). Applying human 
factors theory and HFACS to medication administration in this way helped to consolidate the 
relevance of the concepts in the emerging discourse of patient safety. It was again argued in 
my writing that the historically common blaming of staff involved in medication errors was a 
flawed approach with emphasis being placed on the inevitability of error, a notion that still 
remains counterintuitive to many in healthcare.  
Reference was made in the HFACS article (Milligan, 2007a) to a book by Duffy and Saull that 
analysed ways through which maximising learning from errors had been achieved within 
safety critical industries. Duffy and Saull described the characteristics of a learning 
environment as being a “… a ‘culture’ that reinforces and rewards safe operation” (Duffy and 
Saull, 2003, p.1010). The article (Milligan, 2007a) pointed clearly to the importance of 
education in generating and sustaining such a learning culture. It was in 2012 that the World 
Health Organisation published its ‘Patients safety curriculum guide’. This listed 11 key 
concepts that should be delivered to all healthcare practitioners, number one being ‘What is 
patient safety’, and number two was ‘Human factors theory’ (WHO, 2012). These fit with 
aspects of my writing and the more recent research conducted on errors in NHS systems 
supplying medication to residents in the nursing home sector. 
4.4 Understanding medication error through the human factors theory 
The theoretical and methodological understanding gained through research and publication 
on human factors contributed to later work that linked patient safety incident reports to 
medication errors in the treatment of people with diabetes mellitus (Milligan et al. 2011; 
Milligan, 2012). Knowing the importance of understanding systems as espoused in human 
factors (See for example Dekker, 2011) I was able to anticipate that incident reports from 
NHS staff would contain reference to the care/nursing home19 sector as NHS systems both 
discharge and receive patients from those facilities. NHS systems also provide the 
prescriptions for residents and supply the medication. On this assumption, a Freedom of 
Information Act request was made to the NPSA and data obtained showing that the care 
                                                        
19  The Care Quality Commission criteria for a care home service with nursing was used to differentiate 
between residential and nursing homes for the purposes of the study (CQC, 2010). 
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home sector was indeed involved in patient safety incidents related to residents with diabetes. 
It was not known if the incidents originated in the care home setting or the NHS, but showed 
for the first time that the NRLS was indeed gathering data on care home provision.  
These two publications (Milligan et al.,2011; Milligan, 2012), and ongoing clinical governance 
experience on medication safety, led to the development of research in medication error 
affecting people with diabetes (Milligan et al., 2014; Milligan et al. 2015b). The research 
method selected combined the tried and tested human factors investigation tool, Root Cause 
Analysis20 (RCA), with the notion of investigating medication errors in the nursing home 
setting. The combination proved attractive and funding was secured from the National 
Institute for Health Research21 to support a 2.5 year study into NHS medication errors 
affecting nursing home residents with diabetes (Milligan et al., 2014; 2015; 2015a; 2015b). 
The study was the first of its type to support both the NHS and the nursing home sector in 
attempts to secure the enhanced reporting of, and learning from, medication errors. Data 
collection and subsequent data analysis within the RCA process was structured around the 
four levels of the HFACS system. Error theory in the shape of error classification was similarly 
reflected in data collection and analysis. The first article on this study sought to analyse the 
problems encountered in the data collection process in that the blame culture nursing homes 
were operating in was hindering the reporting of errors (Milligan et al., 2014).22 A second 
publication (Milligan et al. 2015) contained further details on the findings, and utilised the 
notion of organisational influences from HFACS to argue that patient safety incident reporting 
from the primary care sector could be integrated into the NRLS. As nursing homes sit outside 
the NHS they have no formal access to the facility and are therefore not included in feedback 
mechanisms. Changing policy to allow access would, it was argued, enhance system 
understanding of medication processes and the failures that can occur within them (Milligan 
et al., 2015b). GPs are central to the prescribing process for care home residents, yet they 
were known to be ‘poor reporters’. The timing of the study coincided with an initiative from 
NHS England that sought to increase GP reporting through publication of a guide on patient 
safety incident reporting (NHS England, 2015a). A computer desktop icon that could be 
downloaded was also made available. This would sit on the GP computer desktop allowing 
prompt access to the reporting form (NHS England, 2015b). 
4.5 Discussion 
Through my writing and research I have sought to utilise, and encourage others to utilise, 
theoretical and methodological approaches common to safety critical industries such as 
aviation. Establishing and sustaining a discourse of patient safety is inevitably linked to the 
concept of safety culture and the need within such a culture to train and educate on 
                                                        
20  Root Cause Analysis was heavily promoted by the NPSA as a means of investigation patient safety 
incidents. 
21  Total grant awarded by the Research for Patient Benefit Programme for the 2.5 year project, 
£205,782 (Grant number PB-PG-1010-23040).  
22  This research and the issue of blame culture is returned to in the next section. 
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knowledge, skills and attitudes relevant to safety. To be considered a viable and sustainable 
discourse patient safety needs to be a valued part of the education and training that 
healthcare practitioners undertake. The World Health Organisation (2011; 2012) has 
accepted this through the curriculum guidance it has produced, with human factors being the 
second of the eleven key topics identified. To paraphrase Duffy and Saul (2003), a safety 
culture is a learning culture and training and education are therefore integral to the discourse 
of patient safety. As an educationalist and a proponent of patient safety I understood this, 
hence the comparatively early attempt in my work to directly link methods such as the HFACS 
to the problem of drug administration errors by nurses (Milligan, 2007a). The four levels within 
HFACS, as with other human factors theory, point to the broader system explanations of 
error. This understanding of the importance of error theory and system explanations when 
things go wrong led to the methodological innovation of applying RCA and error theory within 
research directed at medication management errors occurring in the NHS nursing home 
interface.  
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5. Objective 4 - Safety culture and its problematic relationship with 
safeguarding   
 
5.1 Introduction 
As mentioned above achieving a more positive safety culture is a fundamental goal of human 
factors in the safety critical industries (Reason, 2008). The establishment of a more positive, 
learning-oriented safety culture reduces the chances and severity of error and improves the 
working lives of staff (Milligan, 2007a; Carayon, 2012). The rise of the concept of 
safeguarding in the UK over the last decade has occurred as part of the emerging discourse 
of patient safety and reflects concerns with the detection and prevention of incompetent and 
malicious practice (See Milligan and Robinson, 2003; Milligan, 2007). Historically healthcare 
has operated a culture of blame – when things go wrong it is an individual or a collection of 
individuals that are seen to be at fault (Vincent, 2010; Dekker, 2011). Yet blame is 
inconsistent with the goal of achieving a positive safety culture as industries such as aviation 
have discovered (Reason, 2008; Gordon et al., 2013). As discussed in section 2, if harm to 
patients is accepted as inevitable, both in terms of necessary harm in attempts to maximise 
health, and unnecessary in the form of patient safety incidents, shifting patient safety 
discourse towards safeguarding and the blame associated with it could be counterproductive. 
This disconnect between being open and fair and the blame inherent in safeguarding, forms 
the focus of this final section. 
5.2 What is safety culture? Being open, being fair 
Although definition of safety culture remains problematic, it is clear that ‘the way things are 
done around here’, probably the simplest explanation of what safety culture means (Reason, 
2008), has changed for healthcare internationally.23 My early publications, utilising the 
concept of iatrogenesis (Milligan, 1998; Milligan, 2000; Milligan and Robinson, 2003; Milligan, 
2003), were an attempt to question the way things were done in a medically driven healthcare 
system and sought to analyse the unnecessary harm in caring for and treating patients. As 
discussed in section 2, the critique of medicine offered by Illich (1990) identified three types of 
iatrogenesis, the last of which was cultural. Illich argued that modern medicine imposes a 
particular cultural view of health and the treatment of disease on people, a view that 
prioritises the biomedical and professional priorities of western medicine (Milligan, 2003). The 
book ‘Limiting harm in healthcare’ attempted to consolidate aspects of that critique and closed 
by saying “... the harm described in this book through the examples and evidence cited has 
                                                        
23  A summary analysis of safety culture and climate and the impact of these on patient safety has been 
provided by The Health Foundation (2011). 
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been about more than mistakes24 – it has been about culture… It is now appropriate and 
necessary to change this culture” (Milligan and Robinson, 2003 p.270). It has been the shift 
away from routinely blaming staff when patient safety incidents occur, together with the 
profound increase in the reporting of patient safety incidents (as promoted in Milligan and 
Bird, 2003b; Bird and Milligan, 2003; Milligan and Dennis, 2005; Milligan et al., 2015), that 
have perhaps been the most obvious aspects of the cultural change seen (NHS 
Improvement, 2016; 2017). It was made clear by the former NPSA (2004) in the Seven Steps 
to Patient Safety, that a culture of ‘being open’ (NPSA, 2009), being able to raise concerns 
and report patient safety incidents, was required of the NHS. The creation of the National 
Reporting and Learning Service (NRLS) had consolidated attempts to create a more open 
culture25 and in the twelve years since its inception has fundamentally changed the culture of 
incident reporting in the NHS.  
The ‘Being open initiative’ asked staff and organisations to apologise and explain when a 
patient safety incident occurred (NPSA, 2005; NPSA/NRLS, 2009). This was promoted, again 
under the heading of safety culture, through an article written whilst at the NPSA (Milligan and 
Dennis, 2005) and was further reflected in publication of audit data on the care and treatment 
of people with acute coronary syndrome (Coughlin and Milligan, 2007). Even though the 
clinical audit data showed that just over 50% of the patients audited had been either over or 
under treated the hospital was still prepared to support publication, a sign of a more open 
NHS culture. More recently the joint GMC/NMC (2015) Duty of Candour guidance has placed 
an obligation on staff and organisations to be honest with patients when things go wrong. 
That obligation was reflected in the Council of Deans of Health research analysed below 
(Milligan et al. 2016; 2017).  
5.3 The conflation of safeguarding and patient safety 
The Care Quality Commission website defines safeguarding as “… protecting people's health, 
well-being and human rights, and enabling them to live free from harm, abuse and neglect” 
(CQC, 2017 no page number). Review of the document, which sets out the CQC’s 
responsibilities, shows that wider patient safety considerations are part of the CQC role, 
including the monitoring of standards of quality and safety. There are then two key functions 
the CQC fulfils - safeguarding, in the sense of dealing with issues of abuse and neglect by 
staff and organisations (CQC, 2015), and the monitoring and reporting of standards achieved 
in relation to the concept of patient safety.  
The rise of safeguarding in the last decade in some ways reflects concerns with regard to 
shortcomings in systems for detecting incompetent and malicious practice (See for example 
                                                        
24  Error would have been a more accurate word here but at the time my knowledge of error theory was 
yet to be enhanced through an understanding of human factors theory. Mistakes are a type of error (see 
for example Reason (2008) and Norman (2013)).  
25 It is now common for practitioners to acknowledge and report incidents with around 2 million reported 
in England in 2016 (NHS Improvement, 2016; 2017).  
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Milligan, 2007). Prior to the demise of the NPSA in 201226  there had been a clearer 
separation between the concepts of safeguarding and patient safety.27 The NPSA was largely 
patient safety focussed with issues of safeguarding and quality monitoring sitting elsewhere in 
other Department of Health bodies such as the then Healthcare Commission.28 As discussed 
in an earlier section, some patient safety incidents involve incompetent and malicious practice 
(Milligan, 2003a; Milligan, 2007), but they remain a small part of the overall burden of 
unnecessary harm generated through patient safety incidents.  
5.4 The impact of blame on medication error reporting 
The research described in section 4 in the nursing home sector was to illustrate the problem 
of conflation between patient safety and safeguarding (Milligan et al, 2015; 2016). The 
Freedom of Information Act request to the NRLS team mentioned in section 4 demonstrated 
that medication incidents were occurring and that NHS staff were being diligent in reporting 
them (Milligan et al. 2011; Milligan, 2012), yet care home staff had no formal mechanism 
through which to report into the NRLS. 29  
Using theory and research methodology from human factors and the data retrieved from the 
NRLS described above (Milligan et al. 2011; Milligan, 2012), I was able to lead a successful 
bid for research funding30 to analyse the origins of NHS medication management errors as 
experienced in the nursing home sector. The research drew on elements of human factors 
including error theory,31 Root Cause Analysis (RCA) and the importance of promoting incident 
reporting (Milligan et al. 2014; Milligan et al. 2015). Elements of HFACS were also integrated 
into the data collection and analysis processes (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003; Milligan, 
2007a). Despite efforts to increase incident reporting throughout the study only 23 medication 
errors were reported. RCA was completed on two of those incidents.32 Medication errors in 
the nursing home sector were classified, using NICE guidance (NICE, 2015), as safeguarding 
issues. An example was suggested in the final report (Milligan et al. 2015a), that if a nurse 
made an error in insulin administration in the nursing home sector it would be classified as a 
                                                        
26  The functions of the NPSA were passed to various other Department of Health bodies including the 
NHS Commissioning Board and at the time of writing sit with NHS Improvement. 
27  Although the discourse of patient safety includes the abuse and inept practice practitioners might 
inflict on patients it was functional to have two separate entities as the NPSA sought to promote patient 
safety incident reporting within a more open and less blaming culture (NPSA, 2005).  
28 In 2009 the Care Quality Commission came into operation combining the functions of the Healthcare 
Commission and the Commission for Social Care.  
29  At the time of the study it was possible for patient safety incidents occurring in the care home sector 
to be reported directly into the NRLS through the NPSA on-line public reporting facility. This function 
was utilized during the research (Milligan et al. 2015) and all the incidents in the study were reported 
anonymously through the NRLS, but care home staff and managers were not aware of its availability. 
Further to this, there was no formal mechanism of feedback to care homes for any incidents reported by 
them into the NRLS system.  
30  National Institute for Health Research, Research for Patient Benefit Programme, grant number PB-
PG-1010-230-40 
31  The term error theory here is used to denote the academic field of theory research and into the 
nature, cause and prevention or errors (See for example Reason (2008) and Carayon (2012).  
32  Evidence from the review of the literature undertaken as part of the study clearly indicated that much 
higher levels of medication error would be occurring (See for example Barber et al. 2009; Avery et al. 
2012).  
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safeguarding issue, but the same error in the NHS would likely be classified as a patient 
safety incident. The latter would likely be dealt with more positively, for example through 
application of the ‘Incident decision tree’ (NPSA/NHS Confederation, 2003) and within a more 
open culture. A conclusion reached was that it would be appropriate to have medication 
errors in the care home setting classified as patient safety incidents, and that NRLS reporting 
systems should be open to the care home sector (Milligan et al., 2015; 2016).33 
5.5 Disclosure and blame in a safety culture 
The importance of patient safety and concepts related to it, and the problematic conflation of 
it with safeguarding, formed the basis of a bid to complete a systematic literature review for 
the Council of Deans of Health on healthcare students reporting concerns with the quality of 
practice (Milligan et al., 2016; 2017). The issue of students raising concerns is important as 
they, like all healthcare practitioners, have an increasingly important role to play in generating 
and delivering feedback on quality. Students, to repeat the analogy drawn in the Francis 
report (2013), bring a fresh pair of eyes to practice environments and this can allow them to 
see, sometimes more clearly than permanent staff, the limitations and strengths of the care 
and treatment being delivered. They may not always evaluate the quality of care accurately, 
perhaps due to a lack of knowledge and experience (Duffy et al., 2012), but as transitory 
participants they bring a different and potentially useful perspective (Francis, 2015).  
In the findings of the systematic review (Milligan et al., 2016; 2017) it was concluded that the 
place and contribution of students in raising concerns required further research, both in 
relation to the experiences of students (what happens to them once they raise a concern) and 
the systems within which they are expected to raise concerns. It was suggested that students 
are in a stronger position now than they have been in the past, in terms of having the 
concerns they raise listened to, as a more open safety culture has become the norm. The 
report re-iterated the recent ‘Freedom to Speak Up’ report (Francis, 2015), in arguing for a 
further cultural shift, a shift in which the raising of concerns of whatever type is increasingly 
encouraged and even obliged in some situations. The review concluded that reporters are 
generally being dealt with more positively, yet this remains a complex area, one that lacks 
clarity around the meaning of concepts central to that reporting process - raising concerns, 
whistle-blowing and where these sit within the patient safety and safeguarding agendas. The 
reviews findings (Milligan et al. 2016) will be used by the Council as a basis for judging 
support for further research in this area (Council of Deans of Health, 2016).  
5.6 Discussion 
The research and publication narrative analysed in this section demonstrate that the 
conflation of patient safety and safeguarding within the remit of the CQC has been shown to 
be problematic through the writing and research described above. Malicious and inept 
                                                        
33 Several attempts to raise this issue in personal communication with senior NRLS staff were made, but 
at the time of writing it is unlikely that the NRLS will be extended to the care home sector.  
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practice are inevitably part of the patient safety agenda as they are a cause of unnecessary 
patient harm, yet they are but a small, if emotive part (Kennedy, 2015), of the total burden 
(Milligan, 2007). With its long history of blame when things go wrong there is perhaps some 
intuitive attraction for healthcare staff in utilising safeguarding as a way of dealing with patient 
safety incidents, yet blame is clearly inconsistent with the goal of achieving a positive safety 
culture (see for example Reason, 2008; Dekker, 2011). A culture of blame has, as has been 
shown here, hindered medication error reporting in the nursing home setting and limited 
progress on understanding the root causes of such error (Milligan et al. 2014; 2015). As the 
literature review for the Council of Deans showed, there are significant drivers in place to 
increase learning from patient safety incidents (GMC/NMC, 2016) and these are shifting 
healthcare towards a less blaming and more safety positive culture.  
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6. Objective 5 – Education and practice 
 
 6.1 Introduction 
This section draws on aspects of the first 4 objectives analysed above and provides further 
evidence on how the emerging discourse of patient safety, the publication and research 
activity undertaken within this, has been integrated into my educational, research and clinical 
work. The section is further supported with detail regarding related conference presentations. 
 6.2 Educational provision 
As evidenced in the previous sections there has been an ongoing and substantial link 
between my academic and research interest in the discourse of patient safety and my 
educational practice. Using those early publications as substantiation of the emerging 
evidence on unnecessary harm in healthcare I was able to successfully argue for increasing 
usage of patient safety and human factors related concepts in educational practice. In the 
early stages of my educational career this was arguably indirect in terms of highlighting 
evidence on unnecessary harm, for example the concept of iatrogenic harm (Milligan, 1998) 
and the potential disadvantages of the general hospital setting (Milligan, 2000). As time 
moved on, however, the links between my writing and research interests became more 
structured as demonstrated through the book ‘Limiting harm in healthcare’ (Milligan and 
Robinson, 2003) and later research on medication safety. The relevance of the concept of 
unnecessary harm in terms of healthcare curriculum development was specifically highlighted 
in the closing chapter of the book (Milligan and Robinson, 2003b) and the heavily cited article 
on nurses committing drug administration errors (See appendix 1).  
These and other early publications, for example Milligan and Bird (2003; 2003a) and Bird and 
Milligan (2003; 2003a) were to add weight to the arguments being made during curriculum 
development at the University of Bedfordshire and, as seen below, helped me gain a post 
with the National Patient Safety Agency. In 2007 I successfully planned and delivered a new 
MSc course title ‘Enhancing quality through patient safety’. The course, based on a modular 
system, included units specifically dedicated to patient safety and human factors theory as 
was the final dissertation required of the degree.  
The position at the time of writing is that all pre-registration healthcare programmes in the 
University of Bedfordshire, including nursing, midwifery, paramedic science and perioperative 
practice, deliver content on patient safety and human factors theory. The WHO (2011) patient 
safety curriculum guide continues, with my support, to be used to structure that provision. The 
current University MSc Advanced Clinical Practice (nursing, midwifery and paramedic 
science) course, a replacement for the earlier MSc ‘Enhancing quality through patient safety’, 
contains a core unit titled ‘Human factors and design for patient safety’. Other post-
  24 
registration healthcare provision at the University, such as community practice programmes 
and the non-medical prescribing course, have patient safety and human factors elements 
integrated within them. Table 1 shows conference presentations demonstrating the promotion 
of patient safety discourse in educational provision. 
Table 1 - Conference presentations related to educational provision 
June  
2015 
Conference 
presentation 
Patient safety and the concept of 
care. 
iCare 2015, University of 
Bedfordshire 
May  
2011 
Invited 
presentation 
Developments in patient safety. Bedford Hospital Trust, 
Bedford 
September 
2005  
Conference 
Core Paper 
Establishing a culture for patient 
safety – the role of education. 
Nurse Education 
Tomorrow, Grey College, 
Durham 
September 
2004 
Conference 
Core Paper 
The patient safety agenda in 
healthcare curriculum development,  
Nurse Education 
Tomorrow, Grey College, 
Durham 
 
 6.3 National and international links  
Research and writing on issues related to patient safety, perhaps most notably the co-edited 
book ‘Limiting harm in healthcare’ (Milligan and Robinson, 2003), supported me in gaining a 
post as one of two nurse advisors at the National Patient Safety Agency in 2004. Working at 
the NPSA allowed me to both better understand the emerging discourse of patient safety and 
actively contribute to the work of the agency in terms of some of the policy and guidance it 
generated. Articles written around that time sought to further consolidate the discourse of 
patient safety and promote the efforts of the NPSA within that discourse (Madden and 
Milligan, 2004; Milligan and Dennis, 2004; 2005). Examples of specific projects contributed to 
include the NPSA Foresight package (NPSA, 2008), an initiative to help practitioners become 
more error wary, and the later Insulin passport work produced by the NPSA (NPSA, 2009; 
2010). Table 2 shows the conference presentations completed in relation to NPSA work. 
Links with the NPSA were further utilised within the MSc Enhancing Quality Through Patient 
Safety course, for example in designing the two hour unseen examination on error theory 
used as part of the human factors unit. 
Table 2 - Conference presentations related to NPSA activity. 
June 2005 Conference 
Presentation 
The patient safety agenda and the 
work of the NPSA. 
Nursing Times Careers 
Event, London. 
April 2005 Conference 
Presentation 
Patient safety and the work of the 
NPSA. 
Royal College of Nursing 
Congress, Harrogate. 
November 
2004 
Seminar 
presentation 
The role of the NPSA in patient safety 
(England Management Team, RCN). 
Royal College of 
Nursing, London 
June 2004 Joint 
conference 
presentation 
The patient safety agenda and the 
work of the NPSA. 
Nursing Times Careers 
Convention, Earls Court, 
London. 
More recently I was invited to be an expert member of an advisory group for Health Education 
England charged with producing medication guidelines for the NMC on the new Associate 
Nurse role (HEE, 2017). As part of the group I was able to encourage the use of concepts 
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such as ‘safety critical medications’ and ‘safety culture’, terms which can be seen within the 
published guidance.  
As an experienced member of academic staff at the University of Bedfordshire I was able to 
secure a five month sabbatical in 2014. I used this opportunity to further consolidate my 
clinical experiences of patient safety, firstly by working as a staff nurse for a day a week on a 
haematology ward, and secondly by arranging a visit to the Anhui Medical University in Hefei, 
China. Having taught patient safety on a range of courses to international students from 
different countries I felt it would be helpful to gain more direct experience of patient safety in 
another country – to experience patient safety as in international agenda. The Anhui Medical 
University staff were very helpful and supportive and facilitated a range of visits to clinical 
areas in two different hospitals in Hefei leading to the sharing of number of ideas and 
experiences on patient safety (see Table 3). The two Universities subsequently signed a 
partnership agreement (University of Bedfordshire, 2015) and exchange visits by students 
from both institutions took place in 2016.  
Table 3 - Conference presentations completed as part of international patient safety work. 
March  
2016 
Invited 
presentation 
Patient safety, 2014 to 2016. First affiliated hospital, 
Hefei, China 
April  
2014 
Invited 
presentation 
Human factors and patient safety. Anhui Medical University 
School of nursing, Hefei, 
China 
March  
2014 
Invited 
presentation 
Patient safety, an international 
concern. 
First affiliated hospital, 
Hefei, China 
 
 6.4 Clinical governance   
An integral part of promoting patient safety has been supporting a range of clinical 
governance initiatives, including long term membership of an acute trust Safer Medication 
group, which more recently became a Medication Safety Group as required under NHS 
patient safety guidance. A number of conference presentations were generated through this 
medication group work (see table 4) which also supported development and dissemination of 
the research findings on the medication error research I have lead (Milligan et al., 2014; 2015; 
2015a; 2015b). The clinical link between my research and writing on patient safety became 
clearly evident when I attended a clinical governance meeting at which audit data was 
presented on adherence to clinical protocols when treating patients with acute coronary 
syndrome. Working with the junior doctor who collated the data I was able to facilitate 
publication of the audit thereby promoting good practice with regard to protocol use and 
development. Publication of the audit data also demonstrated the more open culture NHS 
hospitals are working within (Coughlin and Milligan, 2008). Working as a staff nurse during 
the sabbatical mentioned above also allowed me to gain practical experience and an up-to-
date view on medication management in the acute hospital setting, both of which have been 
valuable in enhancing my contribution to medication management strategies. 
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Table 4 - Medication safety related conference presentations.  
November 
2016 
Invited 
presentation 
Root Causes of Medication Errors in 
Nursing Home Residents with 
Diabetes: Enhancing Safety in NHS 
Medicines Management systems. 
Diabetes Professional 
Care, Olympia, London 
September 
2016 
Conference 
presentation, 
core paper 
Going beyond blame: reporting NHS 
medication errors in nursing home 
residents with diabetes  
Nurse Education 
Tomorrow conference, 
Cambridge 
March  
2015 
Poster 
presentation 
Root Causes of Medication Errors in 
Nursing Home Residents with 
Diabetes. 
Diabetes UK national 
conference, London 
March  
2015 
Symposium 
presentation 
Root Causes of Medication Errors in 
Nursing Home Residents with 
Diabetes: Enhancing Safety in NHS 
Medicines Management. 
RCN Older Peoples 
Forum. Renaissance 
conference centre, 
Manchester 
May  
2013 
Invited 
presentation 
Patient safety and error; a health 
promotion issue.  
256 City of London Field 
hospital, Territorial army, 
London 
October 
2006 
Joint 
presentation  
Reducing medication errors: the role 
of a Safer Medication Group.  
Reducing medication 
errors conference, 
London 
February 
2006 
Joint 
presentation 
Safer medication in the acute 
hospital. 
Patient Safety 2006 
conference, Birmingham 
November 
2006 
Joint 
conference 
presentation 
Involving service users in the work of 
a Safer Medication Group. 
Risk 2006 conference, 
London. 
 
 6.5 Discussion  
The section adds to gaining an understanding on how my research, education and clinical 
governance work has contributed to the emerging discourse of patient safety. It shows that 
the contribution has been consistent over a prolonged period of time and in itself reflects the 
growth of a patient safety discourse and my contribution and place within that discourse. 
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7. The emerging discourse of patient safety - Discussion and conclusion  
 
7.1 Discussion 
When I started researching and writing about the limitations of healthcare in terms of 
unnecessary harm in its various guises there was no coherent discourse of patient safety. As 
shown in this portfolio there was some debate and research on unnecessary harm prior to the 
turn of the century, but not within a rubric of patient safety as now seen. The limitations of 
medically influenced healthcare, in terms of the high levels of unnecessary harm occurring 
evidenced in those early publications (Milligan 1998; 2000), were to be critiqued in more 
depth through later publications and research that sought to analyse, theorise and challenge 
aspects of healthcare that appeared inefficient, prone to error and unnecessarily harmful for 
the patient. At the turn of the century concepts such as iatrogenesis (Illich, 1990), adverse 
events (Kennedy et al., 2000; DH, 2000) and the medical gaze (Foucault, 1991) were in use, 
but it was the subsequent delineation of a discourse of patient safety that brought those 
concerns into focus. As Burr (1995) suggested, a discourse is a particular way of representing 
things, and there is now, as evidenced through the literature and research subject to narrative 
analysis here, a coherent discourse of patient safety. Put simply, unnecessary harm in 
healthcare, harm that is either of no health benefit or potential benefit for the patient, is now 
conceptualised as patient safety, a term now in common usage in both public and healthcare 
discourse. The research, publication, education and clinical governance record reviewed here 
has both supported and added to that usage. 
The application of aspects of human factors theory and methods to healthcare has helped to 
articulate for a wider audience the complex nature of errors and the superficiality of quickly 
and uncritically blaming those involved in error (see for example Milligan, 2007a; Milligan et 
al. 2015; 2015a). The rise in use of human factors methods and theory has challenged 
medicine through its emphasis on a more critical and theory-based approach to team working 
and flattening the hierarchy to improve communication (Gwande, 2010; Gordon et al., 2013). 
My work has through the research methods used, including Root Cause Analysis and 
systematic reviews of the literature, actively promoted aspects of human factors including 
RCA, the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System and error theory. This was 
particularly the case in the research on medication errors in the nursing home setting 
(Milligan, 2007a; Milligan et al. 2015; 2015a). Further challenges to the profession of 
medicine include support, through the writing and research analysed here, for increased 
accountability for the profession by highlighting the possibility and consequences of inept and 
malicious practice, both for the profession itself and individual practitioners (Milligan, 2007a). 
The increasing use of human factors in healthcare has also led to a more substantial critique 
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of safety culture, its definition and problematic relationship with safeguarding, something that 
has been a long-standing theme in my work (Milligan and Robinson, 2003; Milligan and Bird, 
2003a; Madden and Milligan, 2004; Milligan and Dennis, 2005; Milligan et al. 2016; 2017). 
These concepts have been made more accessible to healthcare staff through the promotion 
of them in educational provision as seen in section 6. 
Understanding the complexity of NHS medicine management systems and the frequency of 
error were the motivation for the research into errors in the nursing home setting. As it 
transpired it was to be the fear of blame directed to those involved with, or simply associated 
with, the errors being sought for the study that led to the small number of incidents finally 
gathered, a number lower than that predicted by research (see the analysis given in Milligan 
et al., 2015; 2015a; 2015b). The research led to the critique of the safeguarding agenda 
recently espoused in my writing in that it is still too common for practitioners to seek blame 
when a patient safety incident occurs. One of the conclusions reached through this research 
was that a medication error committed by a nurse in the NHS community or hospital settings 
is likely to be classified as a patient safety incident, but if that same error occurs in a nursing 
home the incident is likely to be classified as a safeguarding event. Inevitably the latter carries 
more blame and a culture of blame holds back the level of safety culture achieved. It is 
argued here that this discrepancy is symptomatic of the unresolved nature of the relationship 
between patient safety and safeguarding in the UK. 
 7.2 Future research and publication 
At the time of writing I am developing another research project titled, “The effectiveness of 
Medicines Use Reviews (MUR) in medicines optimisation for older patients with diabetes and 
respiratory diseases: a realist evaluation of pharmacist recommendations, GP medicines 
management and patient outcomes”. This research will seek to further analyse mediation 
errors in the community context and generate a better understanding of the medicine 
management process within what is a complex interaction of healthcare systems. Two further 
publications will also be generated from the process of collating this portfolio. One will explore 
the conflation of patient safety and safeguarding in more detail, and the second will seek to 
revisit points made in the chapter on malicious and inept medical practice and lessons that 
might be learned from the recent Ian Patterson case (Kennedy, 2015).  
7.3 Conclusion 
Over the last two decades the language used to identify, define and explain the unnecessary 
harm that can occur to patients has evolved into a much more coherent discourse. This 
portfolio has provided a critical analysis of the theoretical, methodological, educational, 
practice and research contributions made by the author to that discourse. Patient safety is 
now a priority in healthcare, although one that has to operate within the political and financial 
constraints that are inevitably associated with care and treatment provision. The evidence 
and analysis given here shows that my publication and research record has both reflected 
and influenced that discourse. It demonstrates that a meaningful publication and research 
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record is in place, a record that continues to evolve and contribute to the growing discourse of 
patient safety. 
 
Word count = 12,906 
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